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Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles
HARRISON HONG, JOS´ E SCHEINKMAN, and WEI XIONG∗
ABSTRACT
We model the relationship between asset float (tradeable shares) and speculative bub-
bles. Investors with heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints trade a stock
with limited float because of insider lockups. A bubble arises as price overweighs op-
timists’ beliefs and investors anticipate the option to resell to those with even higher
valuations. The bubble’s size depends on float as investors anticipate an increase in
float with lockup expirations and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Consis-
tent with the internet experience, the bubble, turnover, and volatility decrease with
float and prices drop on the lockup expiration date.
THE BEHAVIOR OF INTERNET STOCK PRICES during the late 1990s was extraordinary.
On February of 2000, this largely profitless sector of roughly 400 companies
commandedvaluationsthatrepresented6%ofthemarketcapitalizationandan
astounding 20% of the publicly traded volume of the U.S. stock market (see, e.g.,
Ofek and Richardson (2003)).1 These and similar figures led many to believe
that this set of stocks was in the midst of an asset price bubble. In turn, the
valuations of these stocks began to collapse shortly thereafter and by the end
of the same year, they had returned to pre-1998 levels, losing nearly 70% from
the peak. Turnover and return volatility in these stocks also largely dried up
in the process.
The collapse of internet stock prices coincided with a dramatic expansion in
the internet companies’ publicly tradeable shares (or float) (see, e.g., Cochrane
(2003)). Since many internet companies were recent initial public offerings
(IPOs), typically as 80% of their shares were locked up—shares held by in-
siders and other pre-IPO equity holders are not tradeable for at least 6 months
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1 The average price-to-earnings ratio of these companies hovered around 856. Moreover, the
relative valuations of equity carveouts such as Palm/3Com suggest that internet valuations were
detached from fundamental value (see, e.g., Lamont and Thaler (2003), Mitchell, Pulvino, and
Stafford (2002)).
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after the IPO date.2 Ofek and Richardson (2003) document that concurrent
with the collapse of internet valuations, the float of the internet sector dramat-
ically increased as the lockups of many of these stocks expired.3 Despite such
tantalizing stylized facts, there has been little formal analysis of this issue.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between float and stock price bub-
bles. Our analysis builds on early work regarding the formation of speculative
bubbles due to the combined effects of heterogeneous beliefs (i.e., agents agree-
ing to disagree) and short-sales constraints (see, e.g., Miller (1977), Harrison
andKreps(1978),Chen,Hong,andStein(2002),ScheinkmanandXiong(2003)).
We follow Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) in assuming that overconfidence—the
belief of an agent that his information is more accurate than in fact it is—is the
source of disagreement. Although, there are many different ways to generate
heterogeneous beliefs, a large literature in psychology indicates that overcon-
fidence is a pervasive aspect of human behavior. In addition, the assumption
thatinvestorsfaceshort-salesconstraintsisalsoeminentlyplausiblesinceeven
most institutional investors such as mutual funds do not short.4
Specifically, we consider a discrete-time, multiperiod model in which in-
vestors trade a stock that initially has a limited float because of lockup restric-
tions. The tradeable shares of the stock increase over time as insiders become
free to sell their positions. We assume that there is limited risk absorption
capacity (i.e., a downward-sloping demand curve) for the stock.5 Insiders and
investors observe the same publicly available signals about fundamentals. In
deciding how much to sell on the lockup expiration date, insiders process com-
mon signals with the correct prior belief about the precision of these signals.
However, investors are divided into two groups and thus differ in two ways.
First, they have different initial beliefs about fundamentals (i.e., one group can
be generally more optimistic than the other). Second, they differ in their in-
terpretation of these signals as each group overestimates the informativeness
of different signals. As information flows into the market, investors’ forecasts
change and the group that is relatively more optimistic at one point in time
may become relatively more pessimistic at a later date. These fluctuations in
2 In recent years, it has become standard for approximately 80% of the IPO shares to be locked
up for about 6 months. Economic rationales for lockups include to alleviate moral hazard problems,
to signal firm quality, or to prevent rent extraction by underwriters.
3 They find that, from the beginning of November 1999 to the end of April 2000, the value of
unlocked shares in the internet sector rose from 70 billion dollars to over 270 billion dollars.
4 Roughly 70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in SEC Form N-SAR) that they are not permitted
to sell short (see Almazan et al. (2004)). Seventy-nine percent of equity mutual funds make no use
of derivatives whatsoever (either futures or options), suggesting further that funds do not take
synthetically short positions (see Koski and Pontiff (1999)). These figures indicate that the vast
majority of funds never take short positions.
5 It is best to think of the stock as the internet sector. This assumption is meant to capture the
facts that many of those who traded internet stocks were individuals with undiversified positions
and that other frictions also limit arbitrage. For instance, Ofek and Richardson (2003) report that
the median holding of institutional investors in internet stocks was 25.9% compared to 40.2% for
noninternet stocks. For internet IPOs, the comparable numbers are 7.4–15.1%. See Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) for a description for various limits of arbitrage.Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1075
expectations generate trade. Importantly, investors anticipate changes in asset
supply over time due to potential insider selling.
When investors have heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and they
face short-sales constraints, the price of an asset exceeds fundamental value for
two reasons. First, the price is biased upward because of heterogeneous initial
beliefs—when these initial beliefs are sufficiently different, price only reflects
the beliefs of the optimistic group as the pessimistic group simply sits out of
the market because of short-sales constraints.6 We label this source of upward
bias the optimism effect. Second, investors pay prices that exceed their own
valuation of future dividends as they anticipate finding a buyer willing to pay
even more in the future.7 We label this source of upward bias the resale option
effect.
Whenthereislimitedriskabsorptioncapacity,thetwogroupsnaturallywant
to share the risk of holding the total supply of the asset. Hence, each group is
unwillingtoholdallofthetradeableshareswithoutasubstantialriskdiscount.
A larger float or a lower risk absorption capacity naturally means that it takes
a greater difference in initial beliefs for there to be an upward bias in prices
due to the optimism effect. More interestingly, a larger float or a lower risk
absorption capacity also means that it takes a greater divergence in opinion
in the future for an asset buyer to resell the shares, which in turn means the
less valuable the resale option is today. So, ex ante, agents are less willing to
pay a price above their assessments of fundamentals and the resale option is
smaller. Indeed, we show that the strike price of the resale option depends on
the relative magnitudes of asset float to risk absorption capacity—the greater
is this ratio, the higher the strike price must be for the resale option to be in
the money.
Our model generates a number of implications that are absent from standard
models of asset pricing with downward-sloping demand curves. For instance,
the magnitude of the price decrease associated with greater asset supply is
highly nonlinear, with the price decreases being much larger when the ratio of
float to risk-bearing capacity is small than when it is large. Moreover, this price
decrease is accompanied by lower turnover and return volatility since these two
quantitiesaretiedtotheamountofspeculativetrading.Perhapsthemostnovel
feature of our model has to do with investor speculation about insiders’ trading
positions after lockups expire. Since investors are overconfident and insiders
are typically thought of as having more knowledge about their company than
outsiders, it is natural to assume that each group of investors thinks that the
insiders are “smart” like them (i.e., share their expectations as opposed to those
of the other group). As a result, each group of investors expects the other group
to be more aggressive in taking positions in the future since each group expects
that the insiders will eventually come in and share the risk of their positions
with them. Since agents are more aggressive in taking speculative positions,
the resale option, and hence, the bubble is larger. Thus, the mere potential of
6 This is the key insight of Miller (1977) and Chen et al. (2002).
7 See Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).1076 The Journal of Finance
insider selling at the end of the lockup period leads to a larger bubble than
would have otherwise occurred.8
Our theory yields a number of predictions that are consistent with stylized
facts regarding the behavior of internet stocks during the late 1990s. One such
fact is that stock prices tend to decline on the lockup expiration date though
the day of the event is known to all in advance.9 Since in our model investors
are overconfident and incorrectly believe that the insiders share their beliefs,
to the extent that insiders’ beliefs are rational (i.e., properly weigh the two
public signals) and some investors are more optimistic than insiders, there will
be more selling on the part of insiders on the date of lockup expiration than
is anticipated by outside investors. Hence, the stock price tends to fall on this
date.
Our model can also rationalize why the internet bubble burst in the Winter
of 2000, when the float of the internet sector dramatically increased, and why
trading volume and return volatility also dried up in the process. In our model,
a key determinant of the size of the bubble is the ratio of the float to the
risk absorption capacity. To the extent that the risk absorption capacity in
the internet sector stayed the same but the asset supply increased, our model
predicts a bursting of the bubble for several reasons.10 First, the optimism
effect due to heterogeneous initial beliefs suggests that as float increases, the
chance of optimists dominating the market becomes smaller, which leads to a
smaller bubble. Second, a larger float corresponds to a smaller resale option,
and again a smaller bubble. Finally, after the expiration of lockup restrictions,
speculation regarding the degree of insider selling also diminishes, yet again
leading to a smaller internet bubble. We show that a price decrease related to
an increase in float can be dramatic and that this relation is itself related to
the magnitude of the divergence of opinion among investors. Moreover, a larger
float tends to also lead to less trading volume and volatility. Through numerical
exercises, we show that both an optimism effect and a resale effect are needed
to simultaneously capture all the stylized facts.
There is a large literature on the effects of heterogeneous beliefs on asset
prices.11 For example, Miller (1977) and Chen et al. (2002) analyze the over-
valuation generated by heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints in a
static setting. Hong and Stein (2003) consider a model in which heterogeneous
beliefs and short-sales constraints lead to market crashes. Harrison and Kreps
(1978), Morris (1996), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) develop models in
which there is a speculative component in asset prices. However, the agents
8 As long as insiders are not infinitely risk averse and they decide to sell their positions based
on their belief about fundamentals, this effect will be present.
9 See Brav and Gompers (2003), Bradley et al. (2001), Field and Hanka (2001), and Ofek and
Richardson (2000).
10 While internet stocks had different lockup expiration dates, a substantial fraction of these
stocks had lockups that expired at around the same time (see Ofek and Richardson (2003)).
11 A number of papers also consider trading generated by heterogeneous beliefs (see, e.g., Harris
and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Gervais and Odean (2001), Kyle and Lin (2002), Cao
and Ou-Yang (2004)).Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1077
in these last three models are risk neutral, and thus float has no effect on
prices.
There are a number of ways to generate heterogeneous beliefs. One tractable
way is to assume that agents are overconfident, that is, they overestimate the
precision of their knowledge. Indeed, many studies from psychology find that
people exhibit overconfidence (see Alpert and Raiffa (1982) or Lichtenstein,
Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982)).12 This assumption can apply to a number of
circumstances, especially contexts that involve challenging judgment tasks.
Researchers in finance have developed models to analyze the implications of
overconfidence on financial markets (see, e.g., Kyle and Wang (1997), Odean
(1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Bernardo and Welch
(2001)). Similar to these papers, we model overconfidence as overestimation of
the precision of one’s information.
The bubble in our model, which is based on the recursive expectations of
traders to take advantage of others’ mistakes, is different from “rational bub-
bles.”13 Rational bubble models are incapable of connecting bubbles with asset
float. In addition, in these models, assets must have (potentially) infinite ma-
turity to generate bubbles. While other mechanisms have been proposed to
generate asset price bubbles (see, e.g., Allen and Gorton (1993), Allen, Morris,
and Postlewaite (1993)), only Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) speak to
the relationship between float and asset price bubbles. They show that the se-
curity lending fees that a stock holder expects to collect contribute an extra
component to current stock prices. An increase in float leads to lower lending
fees (lower shorting costs) and hence lower prices. Our mechanism holds even
if shorting costs are fixed.14
Additionally, the asset float effect generated by our model is different from
the liquidity effect discussed in Baker and Stein (2004). Their model builds
on the idea that overconfident investors tend to underreact to the information
revealed by the market price. Thus, when these investors are optimistic and
they dominate in the market, liquidity improves, that is, there is a smaller price
impact by an infinitely small trade of privately informed traders.
Our paper proceeds as follows. A simple version of the model without insider
selling is described in Section I. The general model is presented in Section II.
We calibrate our model to the NASDAQ bubble in Section III. We discuss the
empirical implications in Section IV and conclude in Section V. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
12 In fact, even experts display overconfidence (see Camerer (1995)). A phenomenon related to
overconfidence is the “illusion of knowledge”—people who do not agree become more polarized
when given arguments that serve both sides (see Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979)). See Hirshleifer
(2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for reviews of this literature.
13 See Blanchard and Watson (1982) or Santos and Woodford (1997).
14 Moreover, as we discuss in more detail below, the empirical evidence indicates on average only
minor reductions in the lending fee after lockup expirations during the internet bubble, suggesting
a need for alternative mechanisms such as ours to explain the relationship between float and asset
prices during this period.1078 The Journal of Finance
I. A Simple Model without Lockup Expirations
We begin by providing a simple version of our model without any insider
selling. This special case helps develop the intuition for how the relative mag-
nitudes of the supply of tradeable shares and investors’ risk absorption ca-
pacities affect a speculative bubble. Below, we extend this version to allow for
time-varying float due to the expiration of insider lockup restrictions.
Consider a single-traded asset, which might represent a stock, a portfolio of
stocks such as the internet sector, or the market as a whole. There are three
dates, t = 0, 1, 2. The asset pays ˜ f at t = 2, where ˜ f is normally distributed.
A total of Q shares of the asset are outstanding. For simplicity, the risk-free
interest rate is set to zero.
Two groups of investors, A and B, trade the asset at t = 0 and t = 1. Investors







solutions, we use these (myopic) preferences to abstract away from dynamic
hedging considerations. While this specification is not ideal, our analysis will
suggest that our results are unlikely to change qualitatively when we admit
dynamic hedging possibilities. We further assume that there is limited risk
absorption capacity in the stock.15
At t = 0, the two groups’ prior beliefs about ˜ f are normally distributed,
denoted by N( ˆ f A
0 ,1 /τ0) and N( ˆ f B
0 ,1 /τ0), respectively. While the two groups
share the same precision τ0, the means ˆ f A
0 and ˆ f B
0 can be different. At t = 1,
investors receive two public signals
sA
f = ˜ f +  A
f , sB
f = ˜ f +  B
f , (2)
where  A
f and  B
f are noise in the signals. The noise components are indepen-
dent and normally distributed, denoted by N(0, 1/τ ), with τ  representing the
precision of the two signals. Due to overconfidence, group A overestimates the
precision of signal A as φτ , where φ is a constant parameter larger than one,
and group B overestimates the precision of signal B as φτ .
We first solve for the beliefs of the two groups at t = 1. Using standard
Bayesian updating formulas, these beliefs are easily characterized in the fol-
lowing lemma.
LEMMA 1: The beliefs of the two groups of investors at t = 1 are normally dis-
tributed, denoted by N( ˆ f A
1 ,1 /τ) and N( ˆ f B
1 ,1 /τ), where the precision is given
by
15 In other words, the asset demand curve is downward sloping. This is meant to simultaneously
captureboththeundiversifiedpositionsofindividualinvestorsandthefrictionsthatlimitarbitrage
among institutional investors.Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1079
τ = τ0 + (1 + φ)τ  (3)
and the means are given by
ˆ f A





































Investors’ beliefs differ at t = 1 due to two reasons. First, each group of in-
vestors has a different initial belief. Second, both groups place too much weight
on different signals. The second source of disagreement disappears in the limit
as φ approaches one.
Given the forecasts in Lemma 1, we solve for the equilibrium holdings and
price at t = 1. With mean-variance preferences and short-sales constraints, it
is easy to show that, given the price p1, investor demands (x A
1, xB





















Consider the demand of the group A investors. Since they have mean-variance
preferences, their demand for the asset without short-sales constraints is sim-
ply ητ( ˆ f A
1 − p1). When their beliefs are less than the market price, they would
ideally want to short the asset. Since they cannot, they simply sit out of the
market and submit a demand of zero. The intuition for group B’s demand is
similar.
Imposing the market clearing condition, xA
1 + xB
1 = Q, gives us the following
lemma.
LEMMA 2: Let l1 = ˆ f
A
1 − ˆ f
B
1 be the difference in opinions between the investors
in groups A and B at t = 1. The solution for the stock holdings and price on
this date are given by the following three cases:




1 = Q, xB







































1 = 0, xB
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Lemma 2 is simply a restatement of the results in Miller (1977) and Chen
et al. (2002). Since the investors are risk averse, they naturally want to share
the risk of holding the Q shares of the asset. Thus, unless their opinions are
dramatically different, both groups of investors will be long the asset. This is
the situation described in Case 2. In this case, the asset price is determined by
the average belief of the two groups and the risk premium
Q
2ητ is determined
by the total risk-bearing capacity. On the other hand, when group A’s valuation
issignificantlygreaterthanthatofgroupB’s(asinCase1),investorsingroupA
holdallQshares,andthoseinBsitoutofthemarket.Asaresult,theassetprice
is determined purely by group A’s opinion, ˆ f
A
1 , adjusted for a risk discount,
Q
ητ,
reflecting the fact that this one group bears all the risk of the Q shares. The
situationinCase3issymmetrictothatofCase1exceptthatgroupB’svaluation
is greater than that of group A.
We next solve for the equilibrium at t = 0. Given investors’ mean-variance






















where  A and  B are the next-period price change variances under group A
and group B investors’ beliefs, that is,
 A = Var
A
0 [p1 − p0],  B = Var
B




tialbeliefs,asare A and B forthesamereason.Imposingthemarketclearing
condition at t = 0, xA
0 + xB
0 = Q, provides the equilibrium price and asset hold-
ing of each group at t = 0. This equilibrium is summarized in the following
lemma.
LEMMA 3: The stock holdings and price at t = 0 are given by the following three
cases:
 Case 1: If E A
0 p1 − EB
0 p1 >  A
η Q,
xA
0 = Q, xB





 Case 2: If − B
η Q < E A
0 p1 − EB





 A +  B
 
E A









 A +  B
 
E A





 A +  B Q, (14)
p0 =
 B
 A +  B E A
0 p1 +
 A
 A +  B EB
0 p1 −
 A B
( A +  B)η
Q. (15)Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1081
 Case 3: If E A
0 p1 − EB
0 p1 ≤−  B
η Q,
xA
0 = 0, xB





The intuition behind Lemma 3 is similar to that of Lemma 2. The equilibrium
price at t = 0 is upwardly biased because of short-sales constraints as the
optimistic belief (either EA
0p1 or EB
0p1) carries more weight in the price (either
Case 1 or Case 3). In other words, the optimism effect identified in Miller (1977)
and Chen et al. (2002) holds at time t = 0. We are unable to explicitly solve for
EA
0p1 or EB
0p1. However, we can solve for these values numerically, along with
 A and  B.
Below, we provide some intuition for the resulting equilibrium by first consid-
eringthecaseinwhich ˆ f A
0 and ˆ f B
0 areidentical,thatis,thecaseofhomogeneous
initial beliefs. In this case, we are able to obtain closed form solutions, and we
find that EA
0p1 and EB
0p1 are identical, so there is no optimism effect in the
time-0 price. However, we show that there will still be a bubble at t = 0 be-
cause investors anticipate the option to resell their shares at t = 1 in a market
with optimistic buyers and short-sales constraints. In other words, investors
anticipate that there will be an optimism effect at t = 1 and properly take this
into account in their valuations at t = 0. We then consider the general case of
heterogeneous initial beliefs and show that the t = 0 price depends on both the
optimism effect and this resale-option effect.
A. The Case of Homogeneous Initial Beliefs
In this subsection, we illustrate the effects of asset float by considering the
case in which the initial beliefs ˆ f A
0 and ˆ f B
0 are identical. We denote the initial
belief by ˆ f 0.
The following theorem summarizes the expectations of A and B investors
at t = 0 and the resulting asset price for the case of homogeneous initial
beliefs.
PROPOSITION 1: If A and B investors have identical initial beliefs at t = 0, their
conditional expectations of p1 are identical:
E A
0 [p1] = EB














Their conditional variances of p1 are also identical:   =  A =  B. The asset
price at time t = 0 is

















There are four terms in the price. The first, ˆ f 0, is the expected value of the
asset’s fundamental. The second,  
2η Q, is the risk premium required for holding
the asset from t = 0t ot = 1. The third,
Q
2ητ, represents the risk premium for1082 The Journal of Finance













when they have higher beliefs.
Intuitively, with differences of opinion and short-sales constraints, the pos-
sibility of selling shares when other investors have higher beliefs provides a
resale option to the asset owners (see Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003)). If φ = 1, this possibility does not exist; otherwise, the payoff
from the resale option depends on the potential deviation of one group’s belief
from that of the other group.
The format of the resale option is similar to a call option with the underlying
asset as the difference in beliefs l1. From Lemma 1, it is easy to show that
l1 =












(φ − 1)2(φ + 1)τ 
φ[τ0 + (1 + φ)τ ]2, (21)
under the beliefs of either group B (or A) agents. The strike price of the resale
option is
Q
ητ. Therefore, an increase in Q or a decrease in η raises the strike price


















where N is the cumulative probability function of a standard normal
distribution.
PROPOSITION 2: The size of the bubble decreases with the magnitude of the ﬂoat Q
relative to the risk absorption capacity η, and increases with the overconﬁdence
parameter φ.
Intuitively, when agents are risk averse, the two groups naturally want to
share the risk of holding the shares of the asset. Hence, they are unwilling to
hold the float without a substantial price discount. A larger float means that it
takes a greater divergence in opinion in the future for an asset buyer to resell
the shares, which means a less valuable resale option today. So, ex ante, agents
are less willing to pay a price above their assessments of fundamentals and the
smaller is the bubble.
Since there is limited risk absorption capacity, price naturally declines with
supply even in the absence of speculative trading. However, given speculative
trading,pricebecomesevenmoresensitivetoassetsupply—thatis,amultiplierAsset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1083
effect arises. To see this, consider two firms with the same share price, except
that one’s price is determined entirely by fundamentals whereas the other in-
cludes a speculative bubble component as described above. For the share prices
to equal, the firm with a bubble component has a smaller fundamental value
than the firm without. We show that the float elasticity of price for the firm
with a speculative bubble is greater than that of the otherwise comparable
firm without a bubble. This multiplier effect is highly nonlinear—it is much
larger when the ratio of float to risk-bearing capacity is small than when it
is large. The reason follows from the fact that the strike price of the resale
option is proportional to Q. These results are formally stated in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: Consider two otherwise comparable stocks with the same share
price,exceptthatone’svalueincludesabubblecomponentwhereastheotherdoes
not. The ﬂoat elasticity of price for the stock with a speculative bubble is greater
than that for the otherwise comparable stock. The difference in these elasticities
is given by |∂B/∂Q|. This difference peaks when Q = 0( at a value of 1
2ητ) and
monotonically diminishes when Q becomes large.
Moreover, since share turnover and share return volatility are tied to the
amount of speculative trading, these two quantities also decrease with the ratio
of asset float to the risk absorption capacity.
PROPOSITION 4: The expected turnover rate from t = 0 to t = 1 decreases with
the ratio of ﬂoat Q to risk-bearing capacity η and increases with φ. The sum
of return variance across the two periods decreases with the ratio of ﬂoat Q to
risk-bearing capacity η.
To see why expected share turnover decreases with Q, note that at t = 0, both
groups share the same belief regarding fundamentals and both hold one-half
of the shares of the float. (This is also what one expects on average since both
groups of investors’ initial beliefs about fundamentals are identical.) The max-
imum share turnover from this period to the next occurs if one group becomes
much more optimistic and ends up holding all the shares, yielding a turnover
ratio of one-half. However, the larger the float, the greater the divergence of
opinion it would take for the optimistic group to hold all the shares tomorrow,
and therefore the lower average share turnover.
The intuition for return volatility is similar. Imagine that the two groups
of investors have the same initial belief at t = 0 and each holds one-half of
the shares of the float. Next period, if one group buys all the shares from the
other, the stock’s price depends only on the optimists’ belief. In contrast, if both
groups are still in the market, then the price depends on the average of the two
groups’ beliefs. Since the variance of the average of the two beliefs is less than
the variance of a single group’s belief alone, it follows that the greater the float,
the less likely it would be for one group to hold all the shares, and hence the1084 The Journal of Finance
lower the price volatility.
B. The Case of Heterogeneous Initial Beliefs
We now develop intuition for the equilibrium price at t = 0 in the general
case of heterogenous initial beliefs. We first define a function
H(l) ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
























1 ≡ ˆ f A
1 − ˆ f B
1 and l A
1 ≡ ˆ f B
1 − ˆ f A
1 . Following the discussion in the section
on the case of homogeneous initial beliefs, if l = lB
1, then H(lB
1) is the payoff of
investor B’s resale option at t = 1. If l = lA
1, then H(lA
1) is the payoff of investor
A’s resale option at t = 1.
With this observation, we can expand p0 again into four parts as in the fol-
lowing lemma.
LEMMA 4: p0 can be written as
p0
  ˆ f A









  ˆ f A

















0 + ˆ f B
0
2 is the average belief,   is the equilibrium risk premium for holding
from time t = 0 to t = 1,
Q
2ητ is the risk premium for holding from t = 1 to t = 2,
and BH is a bubble component.   is deﬁned as
 
  ˆ f A





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 AQ
η
, in case 1: ˆ E A
0 p1 − EB
0 p1 >  AQ/η
 A B
( A +  B)η
Q, in case 2: − BQ/η ≤ E A
0 p1 − EB
0 p1 ≤  AQ/η
 BQ
η
in case 3: ˆ f A
0 − ˆ E A
0 p1 − EB
0 p1 < − BQ/η
(25)
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ˆ f A













, in case 1
( A −  B)
 A +  B
  ˆ f B




























, in case 2
ˆ f B















The key thing to focus on is the bubble component given in equation (26).
In Case 1, group A investors are the optimist at t = 0 and they own all the
shares. The bubble component in this case has two parts, namely,
f A
0 − f B
0
2 , which
is the upward bias due to heterogeneous initial beliefs or the optimism effect,
and EA
0[H(lA
1)], which is group A investors’ expected value of his resale option
at t = 1. In Case 3, group B investors are the optimist and so the optimism bias
is now given by
f B
0 − f A
0
2 and the resale option component of the bubble is now
determined by group B investors, EB
0[H(lB
1)]. In Case 2, both groups of investors
are long the stock at t = 0 and so the bubble component is a weighted average
of the resale options of groups A and B, but the bias in price due to initially
different beliefs is ambiguous, depending on other factors such as the difference
in the perceived variances of the two groups for holding the stock between t =
0 and t = 1.
Forthemostpart,thecomparativestaticsderivedinthecaseofhomogeneous
initial beliefs hold in the general case of heterogeneous initial beliefs, as we
show below with numerical exercises calibrated to the NASDAQ experiences.
However, there is an important caveat to this statement. When the difference
in initial beliefs is sufficiently large, share turnover can increase (rather than
decrease) with asset float when float is small (counter to the result regarding
share turnover in Proposition 4). To see why, suppose that asset float is small to
begin with and group A is much more optimistic than group B. Then A is likely
to hold all the shares at date (1, 0). As a result, expected turnover in Stage 1
is small because the chances of a switch in opinions is low. Now, imagine that
asset float is slightly higher. Then both investors hold a share of the asset at
t = 1 and any change in their relative beliefs will generate turnover at t = 1.
Hence, an increase in asset float will increase rather than decrease turnover.
In our numerical exercises, we find this reverse effect of float on turnover only
when both initial differences in beliefs are very large and the change in float is
very small. For moderate changes in float or for moderate levels of initially dif-
ferent beliefs, turnover decreases with float. When we calibrate our numerical
exercises to the NASDAQ experience, this effect does not appear.1086 The Journal of Finance
II. A Model with Lockup Expirations
A. Set-up
We now extend the simple model of the previous section to allow for time-
varying float due to insider selling. Investors trade an asset that initially has
a limited float because of lockup restrictions. The asset’s tradeable shares in-
crease over time as insiders become free to sell their positions. In practice, the
lockup period lasts around 6 months after a firm’s initial public offering date.
During this period, most of the shares of the company are not tradeable by the
general public. The lockup expiration date (the date when insiders are free to
trade their shares) is known to all in advance.
The model has infinitely many stages referenced by i = 1, 2, 3,...,∞.
The timeline, described in Figure 1, is as follows. Stage 1 contains three
periods denoted by (1, 0), (1, 1), and (1, 2). Stage 1 represents the dates
around the relaxation of the lockup restrictions. The rest of the stages,
i = 2, 3,...,∞, capture the time after insiders have sold all their shares

(1, 0): Qf shares are initiallyﬂoating





(1, 2): insiders allowed to trade some shares, ﬂoat is Qf + Qin

(2, 0): all of theshares of theﬁrm, ¯ Q, are ﬂoating





(3, 0): assetﬂoat is ¯ Q








(i, 0): assetﬂoat is ¯ Q















Figure 1. Timeline of events. This time line demonstrates the events that occur across different
stages.Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1087
to outsiders. Each of these stages has two periods, denoted by (i,0 )a n d
(i, 1).16
The asset pays a stream of dividends, denoted by D1, D2, ..., Di, ....The div-
idends are independently, identically, and normally distributed, with their dis-
tributions given by N( ¯ D,1 /τ0). Each dividend is paid out at the beginning of
the next stage. There are two groups of outside investors A and B (as before)
and a group of insiders who all share the same information. Thus, there is no
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in this model. In addi-
tion, we assume that all agents in the model, including the insiders, are price
takers (i.e., we rule out any sort of strategic behavior).17
In Stage 1, investors start with a float of Qf on date (1, 0). For generality,
we assume that the groups’ prior beliefs about D1 are normally distributed and
denotedby N( ¯ DA, τ0)and N( ¯ DB, τ0), ¯ DA and ¯ DB canbedifferent.Ondate(1,1),
two signals on the first dividend component become available,
sA
1 = D1 +  A
1 , sB
1 = D1 +  B
1 , (27)
where  A
1 and  B
1 are independent signal noise with identical normal distribu-
tions characterized by zero mean and precision τ . On date (1, 2), some of the
insiders’ shares, denoted by Qin, become floating—this is known to all in ad-
vance. The total asset supply on this date is thus Q f + Qin ≤ ¯ Q. At the lockup
expiration date, insiders rarely are able to trade all their shares due to price
impact considerations. The assumption that only Qin shares are tradeable is
meant to capture this fact. In other words, it typically takes a while after the
expiration of lockups for all the shares of the firm to be floating. Importantly,
insiders can also trade on this date based on their assessment of the funda-
mental. The exact value of D1 is announced and paid out before the beginning
of the next stage.
At the beginning of Stage 2, date (2, 0), we assume for simplicity that the
insiders are forced to liquidate their positions from Stage 1. The market price
on this date is determined by the demands of the outside investors and the total
asset supply of ¯ Q. Insiders’ positions are marked and liquidated at this price
and they are no longer relevant for price determination during this stage. We
assume again that the prior beliefs of the two groups of investors about D2 are
normally distributed and denoted by N( ¯ DA, τ0) and N( ¯ DB, τ0), and that ¯ DA and
16 In the context of the internet bubble, let the stock be the internet sector and the lockup
expiration date correspond to the Winter of 2000, when the asset float increased dramatically as
a result of many internet lockups expiring and insiders being able to trade their shares (see Ofek
and Richardson (2003), Cochrane (2003)).
17 While our assumption of symmetric information among insiders and outsiders is clearly an
abstraction from reality, we want to see what results obtain in the simplest setting possible. If we
were to allow insiders to have private information and the chance to manipulate prices, our results
would likely remain since insiders have an incentive to create bubbles and cash out of their shares
when price is high. See our discussion in the conclusion for some preliminary ways in which our
model can be imbedded into a richer model of initial public offerings and strategic behavior on the
part of insiders.1088 The Journal of Finance
¯ DB can be different. On date (2, 1), two signals become available on the second
dividend component,
sA
2 = D2 +  A
2 , sB
2 = D2 +  B
2 , (28)
where  A
2 and  B
2 are independent signal noise with identical normal distribu-
tions characterized by zero mean and precision τ . Stage-2 dividend D2 is paid
out before the beginning of Stage 3. Stage 3 and subsequent stages all have an
identical structure to that of Stage 2.
We assume that insiders have mean-variance preferences with a total risk
tolerance of ηin. They correctly process all the information pertaining to funda-
mentals. At date (1, 2), insiders trade to maximize their terminal utility at date
(2, 0), when they are forced to liquidate all their positions. Investors in groups
A and B also have per-period mean-variance preferences, where η is the risk
tolerance of each group. Unlike the insiders, due to overconfidence, group A
overestimates the precision of the A-signals at each stage as φτ , and group B
overestimates the precision of the B-signals at each stage as φτ .
Since investors are overconfident, investors in each group think that they
are more rational and smarter than those in the other group. Since insiders
are typically thought of as having more knowledge about their company than
outsiders, it is natural to assume that each group of investors thinks that the
insiders are “smart” or “rational” like them. In other words, each group believes
that the insiders are more likely to share their expectations of fundamentals
than those of the other group, and hence to be on the same side of the trade
as their own group. We assume that the two investor groups agree to disagree
about this proposition. Thus, on date (2, 1), both group A and group B investors
believe that insiders will trade like themselves on date (1, 2).
Another important assumption that buys tractability but does not change
our conclusions is that we do not allow insiders to be active in the market in
Stages i = 2,...,∞. This is a reasonable assumption in practice since various
insider trading rules are such that insiders are not likely to be speculators
in the market on par with outside investors in the steady state of a company.
Moreover,wethinkofStage2asatimewheninsidershavelargelycashedoutof
the company for liquidity reasons. We solve the model by backward induction.
B. Solution
B.1. Stages after the Lockup Expiration
As we describe above, all the stages after the lockup expiration are indepen-
dentandhaveastructurethatisidenticaltoourbasicmodelintheprevioussec-
tion. At date (2, 0), insiders are forced to liquidate their positions from Stage 1
and they are no longer relevant for subsequent price determination. Thus, the
market price is determined by the demands of the outside investors and the
total asset supply of ¯ Q. Moreover, outsiders’ decisions from this point forward
depend only on the current-period dividend as dividend components of earlier
periods have been paid out. As such, we do not have to deal with what theAsset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1089
outside investors learned about D1, nor with the fact that insiders may not
have taken the same positions as them at date (1, 2). In fact, there is no need
to assume that an individual outsider stays in the same group after each stage:
If individuals are randomly relocated across groups at the end of each stage,
our results do not change. In addition, we assume a constant discount factor
R to discount cash flows across different stages; there is no discount within a
stage.
We now discuss the price formation in Stage i, i = 2, 3,...,∞. At date
(i, 0), the prior beliefs of the two groups of investors about the dividend Di
are N( ¯ DA,1 /τ0) and N( ¯ DB,1 /τ0), respectively. We denote their beliefs at date
(i,1 )b yN( ˆ DA
i ,1 /τ) and N( ˆ DB
i ,1 /τ), respectively. Applying the results from
Lemma 1, the precision is given by equation (3) and the means by
ˆ DA
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, (29)
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i − ¯ DB 
. (30)
The solution for equilibrium prices is nearly identical to that obtained from
our simple model in the previous section. Applying Lemmas 2 and 4, we have
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¯ DA + ¯ DB
2
−  ( ¯ DA, ¯ DB) −
Q
2ητ
+ BH( ¯ DA, ¯ DB), (32)
where   and BH are defined in equations (25) and (26). On date (i, 0), the
asset price is purely determined by investors’ prior beliefs of Di, and there-
fore is deterministic. On date (i, 1), price depends on the divergence of opin-
ion between A and B investors. If their opinions differ enough (greater than
¯ Q
ητ), then short-sales constraints bind and one group’s valuation dominates the
market.
B.2. Stage 1: Around-the-Lockup Expiration Date
Duringthisstage,tradingisdrivenentirelybytheinvestors’andtheinsiders’
expectations of D1 because D1 is independent of future dividends. In other
words, information about D1 tells agents nothing about future dividends. As a
result, the demand functions of agents in this stage mirror the simple mean-
variance optimization rules of the previous section.1090 The Journal of Finance
We begin by specifying investors’ beliefs after they observe the signals at date
(1, 1). The rational belief of the insider is given by
ˆ Din
1 = ¯ D +
τ 
τ0 + 2τ 
 
sA




τ0 + 2τ 
 
sB
1 − ¯ D
 
. (33)
Due to overconfidence, the beliefs of the two groups of investors at date (1, 1)
regarding D1 are given by N( ˆ DA,1 /τ) and N( ˆ DB,1 /τ), where the precision of
their beliefs τ is given by equation (3) and the means of their beliefs by
ˆ DA











1 − ¯ DA 
, (34)
ˆ DB











1 − ¯ DB 
. (35)
We next specify the investors’ date (1, 1) beliefs about what the insiders will
do at date (1, 2). Recall that each group of investors thinks that the insiders
are smart like them and will share their beliefs at date (1, 2). As a result, the
investors will have different beliefs at date (1, 1) about the prevailing price at
date (1, 2), p1,2. These beliefs, denoted by pA
1,2 and pB
1,2, are calculated in the
Appendix.
The price at (1, 1) is determined by the differential expectations of A and
B investors about the price at (1, 2). If Qin is perfectly known at (1, 1), there
is no uncertainty between dates (1, 1) and (1, 2). Thus, group A investors are
willing to buy an infinite amount if the price p1,1 is less than pA
1,2, while group B
investors are willing to buy an infinite amount if the price p1,1 is less than pB
1,2.
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as the payoff from the resale option on date (1,1). This function is a piecewise




1 ≡ ˆ f A
1 − ˆ f B
1 and l A
1 ≡ ˆ f B
1 − ˆ f A
1 . Following the discussion in the section on the
case of homogeneous initial beliefs, if l = lB
1, then H(lB
1) is the payoff of investor
B’s resale option at t = 1. If l = lA
1, then H(lA
1) is the payoff of investor A’s resale
option at t = 1.
Given this observation, we derive the equilibrium price on date (1, 0) in the
lemma below.





¯ DA + ¯ DB
2
−  1( ¯ DA, ¯ DB) −
Qf + Qin
τ(2η + ηin)
+ BHS( ¯ DA, ¯ DB), (38)
where
 1( ¯ DA, ¯ DB)
≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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1 Q f /η ≤ E A
1,0p1,1 − EB
1,0p1,1 ≤  A




in case 3: E A
1,0p1,1 − EB
1,0p1,1 < − B
1 Q f /η
(39)
and BH is deﬁned as1092 The Journal of Finance
BHS( ¯ DA, ¯ DB)
≡
⎧
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Lemma 6 is similar to Lemma 4, except that the payoff function from the
resale option now includes speculation about insider selling.
C. Results
C.1. Price Change across the Lockup Expiration Date
Empirical evidence suggests that stock prices tend to decline on the day of
the event (see Brav and Gompers (2003), Bradley et al. (2001), Field and Hanka
(2001), Ofek and Richardson (2000)). This finding is puzzling since the date of
this event is known to all in advance. However, our model is able to rationalize
it with the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: When the belief of the optimistic group in Stage 1 is higher than
the insiders’ belief, the stock price falls on the lockup expiration date.
At (1, 1), right before the lockup expiration at (1, 2), agents from the more
optimistic group anticipate that insiders will share their belief after the lockup
expiration. Since insiders are rational (i.e., properly weigh the two public sig-
nals), they have a different belief from the overconfident investors. Indeed, we
show that the insiders’ belief will be lower than that of the optimistic investors.
As a result, there will be more selling on the part of insiders on the lockup
expiration date than is anticipated by the optimistic group holding the asset
before the lockup expiration. Hence, the stock price falls on this date.
Based on the initial beliefs of the two groups, we can provide sufficient con-
ditions for ˆ Do
1 to be higher than ˆ Din
1 and therefore for the stock price to fall on
the lockup expiration date.
First, consider the general case of heterogeneous initial beliefs. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the initial belief of group A, ¯ DA, is higher than ¯ D,
the unconditional mean of each dividend. Since group A investors start out as
overlyoptimistic,mostlikelytheywillremainmoreoptimisticthantherational
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Since both sA
1 − ¯ D and sB
1 − ¯ D have Gaussian distributions with zero mean, a
linear combination of these two is likely to be nonnegative for more than half of
thetime.Thus,ifweweretodrawthesesignalsinfinitelymanytimes(assuming
independence in the cross-section), the sufficient condition holds over 50% of
the time.
If we assume that the two groups start with identical initial beliefs, then we
can state more precise sufficient conditions. If the two groups of investors start
with the same initial belief belief equal to ¯ D, the optimistic group can still have
a belief that is higher than that of the insiders after the investors overreact to
the observed signals. As we show in the Appendix, the optimistic group’s belief







> ¯ D. (42)
When this condition is satisfied, the group that overreacts to the larger signal
becomes too optimistic relative to the insiders. Since the signals sA
1 and sB
1 are
symmetrically distributed around ¯ D (in objective measure), it follows that the
maximum of the two signals will be greater than ¯ D for more than half of the
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where ρ, the correlation parameter between sA
1 and sB
1, is given by
ρ =
τ 
τ0 + τ 
. (44)
This correlation parameter ρ is between 0 and 1. As ρ increases from 0 to 1, the
probability decreases from 75% to 50%. This range well captures the typical
finding in empirical studies that among IPOs, around 60% of them exhibit
negative abnormal returns on the lockup expiration date (see, e.g., Brav and
Gompers (2003)).
C.2. Speculation about Insider Selling and the Cross-Section
of Expected Returns
Since investors are overconfident, each group of investors naturally believes
that the insiders are “smart” like them. As a result, each group of investors
expects the other group to be more aggressive in taking positions in the future
since the other group expects that the insiders will eventually come in and
share the risk of their positions with them. As a result, each group believes
that they can profit more from their resale option when the other group has a
higher belief.1094 The Journal of Finance
As we show in the proposition below, it turns out that all else equal, the
bubble is larger as a result of the outsiders believing that the insiders are
smart like them. So, just as long as insiders decide how to sell their positions
based on their belief about fundamentals (they have a positive risk-bearing
capacity), this effect will be present. This result is summarized in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 6: For any given initial beliefs of investors on date (1, 0), the value
of the resale option in Stage 1 increases with the insiders’ risk-bearing capacity
from the perspective of each group of investors.
Proposition 6 shows that speculation about insider selling leads to an even
larger speculative component in prices before the lockup expiration, thus a
larger price reduction across the period of lockup expiration.
The exact amount of the price reduction also depends on the volatility of the
difference in beliefs. To make this point more precise, we derive the analytical
expression of the speculative component in the case in which investors have
identical initial beliefs.
PROPOSITION 7: When investors have identical initial beliefs, the value of the















where B is given in equation (22). As the asset ﬂoat increases after the lockup
expiration, the reduction in the resale option component increases with σl.
The calibration exercises of the next section provide a precise assessment of
the price reduction across the lockup expiration in the presence of heteroge-
neous initial beliefs. We rely on the calibration exercises to discuss the associ-
ated reductions in share turnover and return volatility.
III. Calibration and the NASDAQ Bubble
While our model is highly stylized, it is worthwhile to get a sense of the
magnitudes that it can achieve for various parameters of interest. We readily
acknowledge that there are of course a number of other plausible reasons for
why the collapse of the internet bubble coincided with the expansion of float
in the sector. The two that are most frequently articulated are that short-sales
constraints became more relaxed with the expansion of float and that investors
learned after the lockups expired that the companies may not have been as
valuable as they once thought. However, our model provides a compelling and
distinctthirdexplanationthatisworthexploringindepth.Specifically,abubble
bursts with an expansion of asset supply in our model without any change
in the cost of short-selling. This is one of the virtues of our model, for whileAsset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1095
short-selling costs are lower for stocks with higher float, empirical evidence
indicatesthatitisdifficulttotiethedeclineininternetvaluationsintheWinter
of 2000 merely to a relaxation of short-sales constraints.18 Moreover, neither a
relaxation of short-sales constraints story nor a representative-agent learning
story can easily explain why trading volume and return volatility also dried up
after the bubble burst.
We begin our calibration exercises by selecting a set of benchmark parameter
values, around which we focus our discussion. First, we set τ0, the prior preci-
sion of the fundamental, to one without lost of generality. We then let τ , the
precision of the public signals, equal 0.4. In other words, we assume that the
precision of the public signal is 40% that of the fundamental. We also assume
that the fundamental component accounts for 20% of the pre-lockup price (this
is given by a parameter a) and that the bubble component accounts for the
remaining 80% (1 − a). We set R = 1.1 and we let the ratio between asset float
and risk-bearing capacity during the lockup stage, k1 = Qf/η, equal 10.
To complete our numerical exercises, we need to specify the fraction of the
bubble during the lockup stage (Stage 1) that is due to the optimism effect
and the fraction due to the resale option effect. These fractions are determined
by varying two parameters, namely, l0 =|¯ DA − ¯ DB|, the difference in initial
beliefs, and φ, the overconfidence parameter. Let α represent the fraction of
the bubble due to the optimism effect. In the numerical exercises presented
below, we consider various values of α. In these exercises, we are interested
in the effects of an increase in asset float after the lockup expiration, given
by k2 = ¯ Q/η. Hence, we present results for the change in price, volatility, and
turnover for various values of k2.
Finally, to evaluate these effects, we first set ηin = 0, that is, insiders are pure
liquidity traders. Thus, there is no room for investors to speculate over insider
selling after the lockup expiration, and the bias in price in Stage 1 comes only
from the differences in initial beliefs and the resale option. We will evaluate the
effect of speculation about insider selling later by considering nonzero values
of ηin.
Based on these parameters, we calculate the change in price, share turnover,
and return volatility across lockup expiration in Table I. In Panel A, we assume
that α = 1—the bubble is purely due to the optimism effect. First, consider how
the change in price varies with k2. A price drop is defined as the ratio of the
post-lockup price (p2,0) to the price before lockup expiration (p1,0) minus one.
Whenk2 = k1 = 10,thereisnoreductioninprice.Ask2 graduallyincreases,the
size of price reduction rises steadily. When k2 reaches 40 (four times the initial
float),thepricedecreasesbyabout22%.Wenextreportthechangesinturnover
and volatility. When the bubble is 100% due to the optimism effect, there is no
change in turnover and volatility across the lockup expiration. The reason is
that when φ = 1, the optimistic group at the start of each stage remains the
18 SeeOfekandRichardson(2003).Indeed,itisdifficulttoaccountfordifferences,atagivenpoint
in time, in the valuations of the internet sector and their noninternet counterpart to differences in
the cost of short-selling alone.1096 The Journal of Finance
Table I
The Effects of Asset Float across the Lockup Expiration
Thistablereportsthechangeinprice,shareturnover,andreturnvolatilityacrosslockupexpiration
for different values of k2 (the ratio between asset float and each investor group’s risk bearing
capacityafterthelockupexpiration).PanelsA–Earebasedonfivedifferentvaluesofα,thefraction
of the bubble due to the optimism effect. These panels share the following model parameters:
the fraction of the fundamental component in the initial price a = 0.2, the prior precision of the
fundamental τ0 = 1, the precision of the public signal τ  = 0.4, the discount rate R = 1.1, the ratio
between asset float and each investor group’s risk-bearing capacity before the lockup expiration
k1 = 10, and the risk-bearing capacity of the insiders ηin = 0.
Change in Change in Change in
Price Turnover Volatility
k2 (%) (%) (%)
Panel A: α = 1 (100% Optimism, 0% Resale Option)
10 0 0 0
15 −3.64 0 0
20 −7.27 0 0
25 −10.91 0 0
30 −14.55 0 0
35 −18.18 0 0
40 −21.82 0 0
45 −25.45 0 0
50 −29.09 0 0
Panel B: α = 0.75 (75% Optimism, 25% Resale Option)
10 0 0 0
15 −3.95 −10.56 −0.25
20 −11.36 −21.28 −0.70
25 −24.47 −31.02 −1.48
30 −43.43 −39.48 −2.67
35 −62.15 −46.65 −4.35
40 −73.62 −52.65 −6.50
45 −78.22 −57.63 −8.99
50 −79.59 −61.75 −11.60
Panel C: α = 0.50 (50% Optimism, 50% Resale Option)
10 0 0 0
15 −5.11 −12.40 −1.82
20 −14.56 −23.84 −4.14
25 −30.43 −33.84 −6.78
30 −50.73 −42.31 −9.46
35 −67.45 −49.37 −11.91
40 −75.98 −55.18 −13.93
45 −78.97 −59.94 −15.43
50 −79.78 −63.86 −16.43
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Table I—Continued
Change in Change in Change in
Price Turnover Volatility
k2 (%) (%) (%)
Panel D: α = 0.25 (25% Optimism, 75% Resale Option)
10 0 0 0
15 −6.34 −13.01 −2.65
20 −18.17 −24.69 −5.32
25 −36.85 −34.78 −7.66
30 −57.49 −43.26 −9.47
35 −71.49 −50.27 −10.73
40 −77.53 −56.02 −11.53
45 −79.41 −60.71 −11.98
50 −79.88 −64.56 −12.21
Panel E: α = 0 (0% Optimism, 100% Resale Option)
10 0 0 0
15 −7.73 −13.31 −2.18
20 −22.71 −25.11 −3.89
25 −44.85 −35.24 −5.00
30 −64.90 −43.72 −5.64
35 −75.33 −50.71 −5.97
40 −78.86 −56.42 −6.13
45 −79.77 −61.08 −6.19
50 −79.96 −64.90 −6.22
optimistic group at the end of each stage. As a result, there is no turnover in
each stage and hence no change in turnover across stages. Similarly, volatility
depends on whether the price is determined by the expectation of the optimistic
group or by the expectations of both groups. Since we assume that the degree
of heterogeneous initial beliefs, l0, remains the same across stages, there is no
change in volatility across stages. These findings suggest that a bubble due
purely to the optimism effect is not able to account for the empirical findings
related to turnover and volatility.
In Panel B, we let 75% of the Stage-1 bubble (during the lockup stage) be due
to the optimism effect and the other 25% due to the resale option effect. First,
notice that we get a larger price reduction for each value of k2. Apparently, the
resale option is more sensitive to float than is the optimism effect. We begin
to see declines in turnover and volatility. Notice that even though only 25% of
the bubble during the lockup stage is due to the resale option, we are able to
generate a substantial drop in turnover due to an increase in float. Moreover,
we are even able to obtain a reasonable reduction in volatility. For instance,
when k2 = 40, we observe a price decrease of 74%, a turnover decrease of 53%,
and a volatility decrease of 7%. We have similar results in Panel C, where we
set α to 0.5—so 50% of the bubble is initially due to the optimism effect and
50% due to the resale option effect. When k2 = 40, we obtain a reduction in1098 The Journal of Finance
price of nearly 76%, in turnover of more than 55%, and in volatility of greater
than 14%.
In Panels D and E, we increase α to 0.75 and 1.0, respectively. In these two
cases,weobtaingreaterdropsinpriceandturnoverbutthereductioninvolatil-
ity is less pronounced. Indeed, without any initial difference in prior beliefs
(α = 0), an increase in k2 from 10 to 40 causes the volatility to drop by a mod-
est 6%. It is interesting to note that the difference in initial prior beliefs can
make the decline in volatility much more significant. This is due to the fact
that the price in Stage 1 is more likely to be determined by the optimist’s belief
than the less volatile average belief. This finding highlights the importance of
incorporating the difference of prior beliefs in understanding the burst of the
NASDAQ bubble.
Taking stock of the results in Table I, our preferred specification to simulta-
neously match price, turnover, and volatility patterns is for α to be near 0.5. We
need to incorporate heterogeneous initial beliefs to better match the findings of
a significant reduction in volatility following the bursting of the Nasdaq bubble.
Interestingly, empirical findings indicate that subsequent to the busting of the
bubble, price and turnover dropped significantly, whereas return volatility fell
only modestly. Our model delivers such a message—we obtain very large re-
ductions in price and share turnover with an increase in float, but only modest
decreases in volatility.
In Table II, we evaluate the price effect caused by investor speculation over
insider selling. For simplicity, we take the parameter values from Panel C of
Table II
Price Effect of Speculating Insider Selling
This table reports the price effect of investor speculation on insider selling, for various parameter
values of h, the fraction of insiders’ risk bearing capacity to that of the whole market. We use
the following model parameters: the fraction of the bubble due to the optimism effect α = 0.5,
the fraction of the fundamental component in the initial price a = 0.2, the prior precision of the
fundamental τ0 = 1, the precision of the public signal τ  = 0.4, the discount rate R = 1.1, the ratio
between asset float and each investor group’s risk bearing capacity before the lockup expiration
k1 = 10, and the ratio between asset float and each investor group’s risk bearing capacity after the
lockup expiration k2 = 30.
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Table III
Additional Waking-Up Effects
This table reports the additional waking-up effects on the change in price, share turnover, and
return volatility across lockup expiration for different values of k2 (the ratio between asset float
and each investor group’s risk bearing capacity after the lockup expiration). We use the following
model parameters: the fraction of the bubble due to the optimism effect α = 0.5, the fraction of
the fundamental component in the initial price a = 0.2, the prior precision of the fundamental
τ0 = 1, the precision of the public signal τ  = 0.4, the discount rate R = 1.1, the ratio between asset
float and each investor group’s risk bearing capacity before the lockup expiration k1 = 10, and the
insiders’ risk bearing capacity ηin = 0.
k2 Change in Price (%) Change in Turnover (%) Change in Volatility (%)
10 −39.34 2.79 −12.19
15 −49.40 −10.89 −14.11
20 −58.61 −23.02 −15.60
25 −67.01 −33.43 −16.58
30 −73.82 −42.15 −17.15
35 −77.85 −49.34 −17.44
40 −79.44 −55.21 −17.57
45 −79.88 −59.99 −17.63
50 −79.98 −63.92 −17.65
Table I and focus on the case of k2 = 30. We measure insider risk-bearing
capacity by insiders’ fraction in the whole market: h =
ηin
2η+ηin. As h increases
from0to50%,themagnitudeofthedecreaseinpricegoesupfrom50.7%toover
59.9%. As we discuss earlier, as the insiders’ risk bearing capacity ηin increases,
there is more room for outside investors to speculate, thereby causing an even
larger resale option component in the initial price before the lockup expiration.
This leads in turn to a larger reduction in price across the lockup expiration.
Finally, our model is capable of accommodating the possibility that investors
with heterogeneous initial beliefs might no longer have different initial beliefs
after the lockup expiration. This would naturally lead to a decline in prices
after lockup expiration. We label this effect a waking-up effect. In Table III, we
introduce this waking-up effect into our numerical exercises and note how our
results are changed. We take Panel C of Table I and additionally assume that
after Stage 1, investors have homogeneous priors. Not surprisingly, we see that
there is a greater drop in prices as a result of this waking-up effect but they are
not significantly larger once a reasonable amount of float increase, for example
k2 = 40, is taken into account. The upshot is that we are able to do quite well
in matching stylized facts simply using asset float.
IV. Empirical Relevance
Up to this point, we motivate our model using the dot-com bubble of the late
1990s. In this section, we provide evidence (beyond the dot-com experience) in
support of our model. Following the suggestions of the referee, we first review
accounts of earlier speculative bubbles in the U.S. stock market to determine1100 The Journal of Finance
whether asset float also played a key role in these experiences. Second, we
describe empirical research undertaken by Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2004)
that tests the simple model in Section I using data from the Chinese stock
market.
It is not difficult to find fairly detailed accounts of other speculative manias
in the U.S. stock market (see, e.g., Malkiel (2003), Shiller (2000), Kindleberger
(2000), Nairn (2002)). A striking theme in all of these accounts is the similarity
of the dot-com experience to earlier speculative manias. One key similarity
is that all the speculative episodes were engendered by excitement over new
technologies at the time. Examples include the electronics craze of 1959–1964
and the microelectronics and biotechnology excitement of the 1980s. Indeed,
just as in the dot-com era, the changing of company names was enough to lead
to temporarily inflated valuations during these other episodes.
Another key similarity is the importance of speculation along the lines de-
scribed in this paper as a driver of price movements. For instance, Malkiel
(2003, p. 53) writes “And yet professional investors participated in several dis-
tinct speculative movements from the 1960s through the 1990s. In each case,
professional institutions bid actively for stocks not because they felt such stocks
were undervalued under the firm-foundation principle, but because they antic-
ipated that some greater fools would take the shares off their hands at even
more inflated prices.”
However, most relevant from our perspective is that most of the earlier
speculative manias were also most prominent for IPOs with limited asset
float. Indeed, Malkiel (2003) describes as common the fact that during ear-
lier speculative episodes the mania would take off for issues with limited float.
For instance, in describing the environment during the electronics bubble of
the 1960s, Malkiel (2003, pp. 54–55) writes: “For example, some investment
bankers, especially those who underwrote the smaller new issues, would often
hold a substantial volume of securities off the market. This made the market so
‘thin’atthestartthatthepricewouldrisequicklyintheaftermarket.Inone‘hot
issue’ that almost doubled in price on the first day of trading, the SEC found
that a considerable portion of the entire offering was sold to broker-dealers,
many of whom held on to their allotments for a period until the shares could
be sold at much higher prices.” These descriptions fit well with our analysis in
Section I that bubbles are larger when asset float is limited.
In addition to these anecdotal accounts, research by Mei et al. (2004) provides
direct evidence in support of our simple model of Section I. They test our model
using data from the Chinese stock market during the period of 1994–2000. This
market,withstringentshort-salesconstraints,alargenumberofinexperienced
individual investors and small asset float, is ideal for testing our model.
Specifically, Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong analyze the prices of several dozen
Chinese firms that offer two classes of shares: class A, which can only be held
by domestic investors, and class B, which can only be traded by foreigners. De-
spite identical rights, A-share prices were on average 400% higher than the
corresponding B- and A-shares turned over at a much higher rate, 500% versus
100% per year for B shares. This dataset is ideal to test our model becauseAsset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1101
B-share prices and other characteristics allow us to untangle the speculative
component of prices. The tradeable shares of these Chinese companies com-
prise about one-third of all shares (the remaining two-thirds are nontradeable
state-owned shares). The asset float of these companies is calculated using only
tradeable shares.
The paper finds a negative and significant cross-sectional relationship be-
tween share turnover and asset float in A-share markets but a positive and
significant relationship in B-share markets. Since our model predicts a neg-
ative correlation between turnover and float, and liquidity usually improves
with larger float, these results suggest that trading in A-shares is driven by
speculation, while trading in B-shares is more consistent with a liquidity-based
explanation. Moreover, asset float affects share premium. The asset float of
A-shares has a negative and highly significant effect on the A-B share
premium—higher asset float of A-shares, controlling for a host of contempo-
raneous variables including turnover, leads to lower prices of A-shares rel-
ative to B-shares. In contrast, the asset float of B-shares has a negative and
highlysignificanteffectontheA-Bsharepremium—higherfloatleadstohigher
B-share prices and a smaller A-B premium, consistent with higher float lead-
ing to more liquid B-shares and higher B-share prices. These findings provide
out-of-sample empirical support for our model.
V. Conclusion
Inthispaper,wedevelopadiscretetime,multiperiodmodeltounderstandthe
relationship between the float (publicly tradeable shares) of an asset and the
propensity for speculative bubbles to form. Investors trade a stock that initially
has a limited float because of insider lockup restrictions. The tradeable shares
of the stock increase over time as these restrictions expire. We assume that
investors have heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and that they are
short-sales constrained. As a result, investors pay prices that exceed their own
valuation of future dividends because they anticipate finding a buyer who is
willing to pay even more in the future. This resale option imparts a bubble
component in asset prices. With limited risk absorption capacity, this resale
option depends on float as investors anticipate the change in asset float over
time and speculate on the degree of insider selling.
Our model yields a number of empirical implications that are consistent with
stylized accounts of the importance of float for the behavior of internet stock
prices during the late 1990s. These implications include: (1) a stock price bub-
ble decreases dramatically with float, (2) share turnover and return volatility
also decrease with float, and (3) the stock price tends to decline on the lockup
expiration date even though this date is known to all in advance.
One potentially interesting avenue for future work is to imbed our trading
model into a more general model of initial public offerings in which both the
lockup and the offer price are endogenized. Doing so would allow us to address
additional issues such as why we observe underpricing in initial public offer-
ings.Forinstance,inthecontextofourmodel,underpricingmaymakesensefor1102 The Journal of Finance
insiderstotheextentthatitattractsagreaternumberofmarketparticipantsto
the stock. In our model, more investors means better risk-sharing, which natu-
rally leads to a larger bubble. More investors may also mean greater divergence
of opinion, which again implies a larger bubble.19 We leave the clarification of
these issues for the future work.
Appendix: Technical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: See DeGroot (1970).
Proof of Lemmas 2 and 3: Proof follows from substituting the equilibrium
priceintodemandsgiveninequations(6)and(10)andcheckingthatthemarket
clears at both t = 1 and t = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: When investors in groups A and B have the same
initial belief,  A equals  B, we denote these as  . (Moreover, EA
0[p1] = EB
0[p1]













The key to understanding this price is to evaluate the expectation of p1 at t =
0 under either group of investors’ beliefs (since they will also be the same, we
calculate EB
0[p1] without loss of generality). To do this, it is helpful to rewrite
the equilibrium price from Lemma 2 (equations (7)–(9)) in the following form:
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where l1 = ˆ f A
1 − ˆ f B
1 .
For the expectation of B-investors at t = 0, there are two uncertain terms in
equation (A2), namely, ˆ f B
1 and a piecewise linear function of the difference in
beliefs l1. This piecewise linear function has three-linear segments, as shown
by the solid line in Figure A1. The expectation of ˆ f B
1 at t = 0i s ˆ f 0. This is
simply what the investors’ valuation for the asset would be if they were not
allowed to sell their shares at t = 1. The three-piece function represents the
value from being able to trade at t = 1. Calculating its expectation amounts to
integrating the area between the solid line and the horizontal axis in Figure A1
(weighting by the probability density of l1). Since the difference in beliefs l1 has
a symmetric distribution around zero, this expectation is determined by the
shaded area, which is positive.




–Q/η τ  Q/η τ 
Figure A1. The payoff from the resale option with respect to the difference in investors’
beliefs, l1.
To derive the expectation of B investors about p1, we directly use equation
(A2):
EB
0 [p1] = EB
0







































































Equation (17) follows directly. Q.E.D.1104 The Journal of Finance
ProofofProposition2: Define K =
Q
ητ.Notethatl1 hasanormaldistribution
with zero mean and variance σ2









































Similarly, one can show that ∂B
∂η > 0, ∂B
∂τ > 0, and ∂B
∂σl > 0.
The size of the bubble also depends on investor overconfidence φ, the deter-
minant of the underlying asset, that is, the difference in beliefs. Overconfidence
parameter φ has two effects on the speculative components. First, the volatility
of l1 increases with φ. It is straightforward to verify that σ2
l in equation (21)





τ (φ − 1)
 
(2φ2 + φ + 1)τ0 + (φ + 1)(3φ + 1)τ 
 
φ2[τ0 + (1 + φ)τ ]3 > 0. (A8)
Second, an increase in φ raises the belief precision τ, which in turn reduces the
“strike price”
Q
ητ of the resale option t = 1. Therefore, the speculative component
increases with φ. Q.E.D.










l > 0. (A9)
Thus, B is convex with respect to Q. It is straightforward to see that ∂B/∂Q is
always negative. Its magnitude |∂B/∂Q| peaks at Q = 0 with a value of 1
2ητ, and
it monotonically diminishes as Q becomes large.


















For two otherwise comparable firms, that is, for two firms that share identical
Q, p0, η,  ,and∂ /∂Q,butonlyonehasthebubblecomponentinprice,thefirm
with the bubble component also has a greater float elasticity of price. Q.E.D.Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1105
Proof of Proposition 4: At t = 0, xA
0 = xB
0 = Q/2. We define the trading vol-
ume at t = 1b y|xA
1 − xB










By using our discussion of the equilibrium at t = 0 above, we can show
ρ0→1 =
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1 ). Then, it follows that
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
2
if m > 1
|m|
2
if −1 ≤ m ≤ 1
1
2
if m < −1.
(A13)











Thus, m has a normal distribution with zero mean and a variance of
σ2
m =
2η2(φ − 1)2τ 
Q2 (A15)











It is easy to see that as Q increases, the distribution of m becomes more cen-
tered around zero. Because ρ0→1 has a greater value away from zero, E0[ρ0→1]
decreases with Q. Intuitively, when more shares are floating, it takes a greater
difference in beliefs to turn over all the shares. All else equal, the expected
share turnover rate decreases with float.1106 The Journal of Finance
Similarly, as φ increases, the distribution of m becomes more dispersed. As
a result, E0[ρ0→1] rises. Intuitively, when agents are more overconfident, there
is more dispersion in beliefs, and therefore more turnover.
To discuss price volatility, we can rewrite
p1 = constant +
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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It is important to note that, in an objective measure,
ˆ f A





1 − ˆ f B
1
2 , and ˜ f is also independent from
ˆ f A
1 − ˆ f B
1
2 . Define l1 = ˆ f A
1 − ˆ f B
1 .W e
obtain
p1 = constant +
ˆ f A
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The price change variance from t = 0t ot = 1 has two components, that is,
Var[p1 − p0] = Var
   ˆ f A
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= (1 + φ
 2τ2
 
τ2(1/τ0 + 2/τ ) + Var[G(l1)]. (A20)Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1107
The price change variance from t = 1t ot = 2i s
Var[p2 − p1] = Var
  ˜ f −
  ˆ f A




















= [1 − (1 + φ)τ /τ]2 1
τ0
+
(1 + φ)2τ 
2τ2 + Var[G(l1)]. (A21)
Thus, the sum of return variance across the two periods is




+ (φ2 − 1)
τ 
τ2 + 2Var[G(l1)]. (A22)
The first two components in V are independent of the float. The third compo-
nentdecreaseswithQ.Todemonstratethis,weonlyneedtoshowthatVar[G(l1)]
decreases with A =
Q


























2(φ − 1)2τ 
[τ0 + (1 + φ)τ ]2 (A24)











[1 − 2N(−A/υl)] < 0. (A25)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: Lemma 2 allows us to derive the expectations of group
A and group B investors at t = 0a s
E A















= ˆ f A













, (A26)1108 The Journal of Finance
EB






























We can also derive the conditional variance:
 B = Var
B
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1 having a distribution of N(
τ0
τ ( ˆ f B
0 − ˆ f A
0 ), σ2
l ) in the mind of A investors.
The initial price and asset holding at t = 0 are then given by the following
three cases.
Case 1: ˆ f A
0 − ˆ f B








ητ)] >  AQ/η,
xA
0 = Q, xB
0 = 0, (A30)
p0 = ˆ f A






































Case 2: − BQ/η ≤ ˆ f A
0 − ˆ f B
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=
ˆ f A
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Case 3: ˆ f A
0 − ˆ f B








ητ)] < − BQ/η,
xA
0 = 0, xB
0 = Q, (A36)







































By collecting terms, we obtain the price function in Lemma 4.
To compute the properties of the equilibrium, note that lA
1 has a distribution
of N(
τ0
τ ( ˆ f B
0 − ˆ f A
0 ), ν2
l ) from an objective observer, where
ν2
l =
2(φ − 1)2τ 
[τ0 + (φ + 1)τ ]2. (A39)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: To derive the price at (1, 1), we start by deriving the
expectation of each group about the next-period price.
A. Calculating A-Investors’ Belief about p1,2
In calculating A’s belief about p1,2, note that group A investors’ belief on date
(1, 1) about the demand functions of each group on date (1, 2) is given by
xin


















, (A41)1110 The Journal of Finance
xB
1,2 = ητ max







Note that from group A’s perspective, the insiders’ demand function is deter-
mined by ˆ DA
1 . This is the sense in which group A investors think that the




1,2 = Qf + Qin. (A43)
Depending on the difference in the two groups’ expectations about fundamen-
tals, three possible cases arise.
Case 1: ˆ DA
1 − ˆ DB
1 > 1
τ(η+ηin)(Qf + Qin). In this case, A investors value the
asset much more than B-investors. Therefore, A investors expect that they and
the insiders will hold all the shares at (1, 2):
xA
1,2 + xin
1,2 = Qf + Qin, xB
1,2 = 0. (A44)











(Qf + Qin). (A45)
We put a superscript A on price pA
1,2 to emphasize that this is the price expected
by group A investors at (1, 1). The realized price on (1, 2) might be different
since insiders do not share the same belief as group-A investors in reality. Since
A investors expect insiders to share the risk with them, the risk premium is
determined by the total risk bearing capacity of A investors and insiders.
Case 2: − 1
τη(Qf + Qin) ≤ ˆ DA
1 − ˆ DB
1 ≤ 1
τ(η+ηin)(Qf + Qin). In this case, the two
groups’ beliefs are not too far apart and both hold some of the assets at (1, 2).
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(Qf + Qin). (A47)
















(Qf + Qin). (A48)
Since both groups participate in the market, the price is determined by a
weighted average of the two groups’ beliefs. The weights are related to the
risk-bearing capacities of each group. Notice that A investors’ beliefs receive a
larger weight in the price because A investors expect insiders to take the sameAsset Float and Speculative Bubbles 1111
positions as them on date (1, 2). The risk premium term depends on the total
risk bearing capacity in the market.
Case 3: ˆ DA
1 − ˆ DB
1 < − 1
τη(Qf + Qin). In this case, the A investors’ belief is
much lower than that of the B investors. Thus, A investors stay out of market
at (1, 2). Since they also believe that insiders share their beliefs, A-investors
anticipate that all the shares of the company will be held by B-investors. In
other words, we have
xA
1,2 + xin
1,2 = 0, xB
1,2 = Qf + Qin. (A49)









(Qf + Qin), (A50)
and the risk premium term only depends on the risk-bearing capacity of
B-investors.
B. Calculating B-Investors’ Belief about p1,2
Following a similar procedure as that for group A investors, we can derive
what B investors expect the price at date (1, 2) to be. This price pB




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
R




(Qf + Qin)i f ˆ DA
































(Qf + Qin)i f ˆ DA








1,2 is similar in form to pA
1,2 except that the price weights the belief
of B-investors, ˆ DB
1 , more than that of A investors since B investors think that
the insiders share their expectations.
C. The Equilibrium Price p1,2










1,2, we obtain Lemma 5. Q.E.D.1112 The Journal of Finance
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1,0[p1,1 − p1,0],  B
1 = Var
B
1,0[p1,1 − p1,0]. (A56)
The market clearing condition on date (1, 0) implies the following three
cases:
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By substituting expectations of group A and group B investors in equations
(A54) and (A55) into the equilibrium prices in these three cases, we obtain
Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let o ∈{ A, B} be the group with the more optimistic
belief in Stage 1, that is, ˆ Do
1 ≥ ˆ D¯ o
1. The stock price on (1, 1) is determined by
the market clearing condition for period (1, 2) in the group-o investors’ mind,
as group-o investors think that insiders share their belief when they start to



















p2,0 + ˆ D¯ o
1 − p1,1,0
 
= Qf + Qin. (A62)
The stock price on (1, 2) is determined by the actual market clearing at that
time when insiders start to trade based on their actual belief:


















p2,0 + ˆ D¯ o
1 − p1,2,0
 
= Qf + Qin. (A63)
Note that equations (A62) and (A63) are strictly decreasing with p1,1 and p1,2,
respectively. Since τ0 + 2τ  <τand ˆ Din
1 < ˆ Do
1, equations (A62) and (A63) imply
that p1,2 < p1,1.
Depending on the initial beliefs of the two groups, we can provide some suf-
ficient conditions for ˆ Do
1 to be higher than ˆ Din
1 .
Case 1: The two groups start with heterogeneous priors.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the prior belief of group A, ¯ DA,
is higher than ¯ D, the unconditional mean of each dividend. Given the beliefs
of the insiders and group A investors in equations (33) and (34), we can derive
the difference between them as
ˆ DA


























































( ¯ DA − ¯ D),
(A65)
the group-o investors’ belief is higher than the insiders’ belief:1114 The Journal of Finance
ˆ Do
1 − ˆ Din
1 ≥ ˆ DA
1 − ˆ Din
1 > 0. (A66)
Case 2: The two groups start with identical priors.
Since ¯ DA = ¯ DB, by directly comparing beliefs in equations (34) and (35), we
have so
1 ≥ s¯ o
1. Given that so
1 > ¯ D, we can show that ˆ Din
1 < ˆ Do
1:
ˆ Do
1 − ˆ Din














































1 − ¯ D
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(φ − 1)τ0τ 
τ(τ0 + 2τ )
 
so
1 − ¯ D
 
> 0, (A67)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that 1
τ < 1
τ0 +2τ  and so
1 > s¯ o
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: According to Lemma 5, the payoff function of the
resaleoptionisH1 definedinequation(37).Itisobvioustoverifythatthispayoff
function increases monotonically with the insiders’ risk bearing capacity ηin for
any given level of difference in beliefs. Thus, the value of the resale option
on date (1, 0) is increasing with ηin from the perspective of either group of
investors. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: When investors have identical prior beliefs, l1 =
ˆ DA
1 − ˆ DB
1 hasasymmetricGaussiandistributionwithzeromeanandavariance
of σ2


























































Then, it is straightforward to verify that the B investors’ expectation of the













































in Stage 1 and k2 determines the resale option component in later stages. Direct





















































































(BH − B( ¯ Q/η)) > 0. (A74)
Q.E.D.
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